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Abstract. Though Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have sur-
passed human-level performance on tasks such as object classification
and face verification, they can easily be fooled by adversarial attacks.
These attacks add a small perturbation to the input image that causes
the network to mis-classify the sample. In this paper, we focus on neutral-
izing adversarial attacks by compact feature learning. In particular, we
show that learning features in a closed and bounded space improves the
robustness of the network. We explore the effect of L2-Softmax Loss, that
enforces compactness in the learned features, thus resulting in enhanced
robustness to adversarial perturbations. Additionally, we propose com-
pact convolution, a novel method of convolution that when incorporated
in conventional CNNs improves their robustness. Compact convolution
ensures feature compactness at every layer such that they are bounded
and close to each other. Extensive experiments show that Compact Con-
volutional Networks (CCNs) neutralize multiple types of attacks, and
perform better than existing methods in defending adversarial attacks,
without incurring any additional training overhead compared to CNNs.
Keywords: Adversarial Attacks, Convolutional Neural Networks, Com-
pact Convolution, Adversarial Robustness
1 Introduction
In recent years, CNNs have gained tremendous popularity because of their im-
pressive performance on many vision-related tasks. They are being widely used
in many practical applications such as self-driving cars, face verification, etc.
However, it has been shown that CNNs are vulnerable to small adversarial per-
turbations which, when added to the input image, can cause the network to
mis-classify with high confidence [1,2,3,4]. Adversarial images thus generated
are often visually indistinguishable from the original images.
Adversarial attacks have emerged as a potential threat to CNN-based sys-
tems. Adversarial images can be used by a suspect to fool a face verification
system, by letting the person go unidentified. These attacks can also cause self-
driving cars to mis-classify scene objects such as a stop sign leading to adverse
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Fig. 1. Five test samples from CIFAR10 [5] dataset (top) that are correctly classified
by both CNN and CCN. Corresponding adversarial images crafted using DeepFool [3]
attack and misclassified by CNN (middle) and CCN (bottom). The adversarial attacks
on CCN can be detected trivially by human observer.
effects when these systems are deployed in real time. As networks move from the
research labs to the field, they need to be designed in a way that they are not
only accurate, but also robust to adversarial perturbations. Several recent works
have been proposed to improve robustness, such as adversarial training [2,6],
gradient masking [7], etc. In this work, we impose constraints on the sensitivity
of the learned feature space and using our insight, propose a modified convo-
lution operation that can desensitize the learned mapping in the direction of
adversarial perturbations.
It has been hypothesized that CNNs learn a highly non-linear manifold on
which the images of same class lie together, while images from different class
are separated. Hence, the original image and the adversarial image lying close
to each other in Euclidean space, are far separated on the manifold or in feature
space. When designing a robust classifier, we would like to address the following
question: Can we bring the original and perturbed images closer in the feature
space of a learned mapping to improve its robustness? To address this question,
we employ the property of compactness in the context of feature learning that
would enhance a network’s robustness to adversarial attacks. Compactness en-
forces the features to be bounded and lie in a closed space. It reduces the degree
of freedom for the features to be learned. This restricts the extent to which a
feature for perturbed image can move, making it less likely to cross the class
boundary.
To enforce compactness in the feature space, we explore the L2-Softmax Loss
proposed by Ranjan et al. [8]. The L2-Softmax Loss establishes compactness by
constraining the features to lie on a hypersphere of fixed radius, before applying
the softmax loss. It brings the intra-class features close to each other and sepa-
rates the inter-class features far apart. In this way, features from the original and
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the adversarial image are closer to each other using L2-Softmax Loss, compared
to training with regular softmax loss (see Fig. 2).
Using these insights, we propose a novel convolution method, called com-
pact convolution, that significantly enhances a network’s robustness by ensuring
compact feature learning at every layer of the network. A compact convolution
module applies the L2-normalization step and scaling operations to every in-
put patch before applying the convolutional kernel in a sliding window fashion.
Compact Convolutional Networks (CCNs), built using these modules, are highly
robust compared to a typical CNN. Fig. 1 shows some sample images and cor-
responding adversarial attacks generated using DeepFool [3] to fool a CNN and
a CCN. The adversarial samples for CCN can easily be distinguished from the
original samples by a human observer. The figure shows that CCNs are robust
to small adversarial perturbations such that to fool a CCN the magnitude of
perturbations required is much higher, which completely distorts the image and
can be detected easily. The paper makes the following key contributions:
•We explore the property of Compactness in the context of feature learning, and
demonstrate its effectiveness in making a network robust to adversarial attacks.
•We propose to use L2-Softmax Loss as a defense mechanism against adversarial
perturbations.
•We propose compact convolutional modules that increases the network stability
by enforcing Compactness to features at every layer in the network.
• We achieve new state-of-the-art results on defending white-box as well as
black-box attacks.
2 Related Works
A lot of research has gone into generating adversarial perturbations to fool a deep
network. Szegedy et al. [1] first showed the existence of adversarial perturbations
in CNNs and proposed a L-BFGS based optimization scheme to generate the
same. Later, Goodfellow et al. [2] proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
to generate adversarial samples. DeepFool [3] attack iteratively finds a minimal
perturbation required to cause a network to mis-classify. Other recently proposed
adversarial attacks include Jacobian-based Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) [9],
Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack [10], Universal Perturbations [4], etc.
To safeguard the network from adversarial attacks, researchers have focused
on two approaches: 1) Adversarial Detection, and 2) Adversarial Defense. Meth-
ods based on adversarial detection [11,12,13,14] attempt to detect an adversarial
sample before passing it through the network for inference. These methods put
an extra effort in designing a separate adversarial detector which itself has the
risk of being fooled by the attacker. Recently, Carlini and Wagner [15] showed
that most of the adversarial detectors are ineffective and can be fooled.
The methods based on adversarial defense aim at improving the network’s
robustness to classify adversarial samples correctly. One way to achieve robust-
ness is by simultaneously training the network with clean and adversarial sam-
ples [2,16,17,18]. These methods are stable to the attack on which they are
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trained, but ineffective against a different attack. Preprocessing the input to
nullify the adversarial effect is another way to defend the network [19,20]. Few
methods have focused on modifying the network topology or optimization pro-
cedure for adversarial defense. Gu and Rigazio [21] proposed Deep Contractive
Network that adds a smoothness penalty on the partial derivatives at every
layer. Cisse et al. [22] proposed Parseval Networks that improves robustness by
enforcing the weight matrices of convolutional and linear layers to be Parse-
val tight frames. Papernot et al. [23] showed that knowledge distillation with
high temperature parameter can be used as defense against adversarial samples.
Warde et al. [24] showed that a similar robustness as defensive distillation can
be obtained by training the network with smooth labels. Zantedeschi et al. [25]
used Bounded ReLU activations to enhance network’s stable to adversarial per-
turbations.
While these methods have focused on improving defense to adversarial at-
tacks in general, most of them have focused on white box attacks and incur
additional computational overhead during training. In this work, we propose an
approach to achieve adversarial defense in CNNs using compact convolutions
which can be seamlessly integrated into any existing deep network architecture.
We further demonstrate its effectiveness against both white box and black box
adversarial attacks.
3 Compact Learning for Adversarial Defense
3.1 Compactness
Compactness is a property associated with a subset of Euclidean space which is
closed and bounded. A space is closed when it contains all its limiting points.
A space is bounded when all its points lie within a fixed distance of each other.
Euclidean space in itself is not compact, since it is not bounded.
The features obtained from a typical CNN are not compact, since the softmax
loss does not constrain them to lie in a closed or bounded space. It distributes the
features in the Euclidean space such that the overall training loss is minimized.
In a way, it over-fits to the training domain. Thus an adversarially perturbed
image, although close to the original image in input space, can lie very far away
in the Euclidean feature space. On the other hand, features learned on a compact
space have restricted degrees of freedom which does not allow the adversarial
features to move far away from the original features. A given perturbed image
would lie farther from the original image in the Euclidean space compared to a
compact space. Thus compact feature learning helps in improving the robustness
of the network.
One way to enforce compactness on the CNN features is to restrict them to lie
on a compact space during training. A simple example of a compact space is a hy-
persphere manifold, which is both closed and bounded. L2-Softmax Loss [8] (dis-
cussed in Section 3.2), performs compact feature learning by constraining the
features to lie on a hypersphere of a fixed radius.
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3.2 L2-Softmax Loss
L2-Softmax loss was recently proposed by Ranjan et al. [8] for improving the
task of face verification. The loss imposes a constraint on the deep features to
lie on a hypersphere of a fixed radius, before applying the softmax penalty. The
loss is defined as:
LS = −
m∑
i=1
log
e
WTyi
(
αxi
‖xi‖2 )+byi∑n
j=1 e
WTj (
αxi
‖xi‖2 )+bj
, (1)
where xi is the i
th deep feature for the class label yi, Wj is the weight and
bj is the bias corresponding to the class j, α is a positive scalar parameter, and
m, n are the batch-size and number of classes respectively. The features are first
normalized to unit length and then scaled by α before passing it through the
softmax classifier. Constraining the features to lie on a hypersphere reduces the
intra-class variations and enhances the inter-class separability.
(a) (c)
Fig. 2. Feature vizualization from the last layer (dimension=2) of CNN trained on
MNIST [26] with (a) Softmax Loss, (b) L2-Softmax Loss [8].
From Fig. 2(a), we can see that the features trained using softmax loss do
not satisfy the compactness property since the feature space is not closed or
bounded. The L2-Softmax Loss constrains the features to lie on a hypersphere
manifold which is a closed space. Also, the L2-norm of the feature vectors is
always constant and equal to α, which makes the feature space bounded. Hence,
the L2-Softmax Loss obeys the compactness property (Fig. 2(b)). Experimental
analysis (see section 5) shows that L2-Softmax Loss is more robust to adversarial
attacks than softmax loss. To the best of our knowledge, L2-Softmax loss has
not been used for adversarial defense before.
3.3 Sub-linearity of Adversarial Examples with Compact Learning
In this section, we show that compact feature learning restricts the change in
activation due to perturbation η to grow sub-linearly with the input dimension.
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Consider a linear model with weight vector w and input vector x with dimension
n. Let the adversarial example be represented as x˜ = x + η. The activation is
given by the dot product:
wT x˜ = wTx+ wT η (2)
It was shown by Goodfellow et al. [2] that the change in activation wT η will
grow with mn, where m is the average magnitude of the weight vector, and
‖η‖∞ < . Thus, the effect of adversarial perturbation increases linearly with
the input dimension. Now, with compact feature learning using L2-Softmax loss
with α = 1, (2) can be rewritten as:
wT
x˜
‖x˜‖2 = w
T x
‖x+ η‖2 + w
T η
‖x+ η‖2 . (3)
The second term in (3) is the change in activation due to adversarial pertur-
bation. The denominator in this term, which is the L2-norm of the perturbed
signal (‖x+ η‖2), changes proportional to the square root of the dimension of x.
This can be intuitively thought of as follows. Let the average absolute activation
of x be p. Then the L2-norm of the signal x can be well approximated by p
√
n.
While the scaling factor (p) depends on the actual variations in the feature value,
the dependency on the dimension is clear. Applying this insight to ( 3), we see
that the change in the activation now grows at the rate of
√
n instead of n, due
to the normalizing factor in the denominator. Thus, for a given input dimension,
the change in activation due to adversarial perturbation would be smaller for
compact features compared to the typical CNN features, which makes it ideal
for training a robust network.
4 Compact Convolution
The L2-Softmax loss [8] enforces compactness only to deep features from the last
layer of CNN. It was motivated by efficient representation of normalized feature
at the output space, whereas in this paper we want to reduce the sensitivity
of the activations at each layer to spurious perturbations. Hence, we propose
to extend the compactness property to features from the intermediate layers of
CNNs as well. A typical CNN is a hierarchy of convolutional and fully-connected
layers stacked with non-linear activation functions after every layer. A discrete
convolution is a linear function applied on a patch of a signal in a sliding window
fashion. Let W be the convolution kernel of size 2k + 1, xn,k be an input patch
defined as:
xn,k = [x(n− k), x(n− k + 1), ..., x(n+ k)], (4)
where x(n) is the nth element of input vector x. The convolution operation
is represented as:
y(n) = WTxn,k, (5)
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where y(n) is the nth element of the output vector y. To enforce compactness
in convolutional layers, we need to ensure that every input patch at a given loca-
tion is first L2-normalized and scaled before multiplying with the convolutional
kernel W . Formally, we want the convolution output (y˜(n)) at position n to be:
y˜(n) = WT
(αxn,k)
‖xn,k‖2 + δ , (6)
where δ is a small constant added to avoid division by zero. We call this new
method of patch-normalized convolution as compact convolution. A toy example
depicting the difference between typical convolution and compact convolution is
shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. A toy example for convolution (left) and compact convolution (right).
In a deep CNN, the convolution kernel is typically applied to high dimensional
feature maps. Normalizing every feature patch before multiplying with the con-
volutional kernel is computationally expensive and redundant, since the patches
are overlapping. To implement compact convolution efficiently in a deep net-
work, we propose a compact convolution module (shown in Fig. 4). We split the
input feature map into two branches. The first branch carries out the traditional
convolution operation with parameters of size k× k, without bias addition. The
second branch first computes the sum of squares along the channel dimension
of the input. Subsequently, it is convolved with a k × k kernel containing fixed
value of all ones. This step provides the squared L2-Norm of sliding-window
patches for every output location in a feature map. We perform element-wise
square-root on top of it and add a small constant δ = 0.01. Lastly, each chan-
nel of the convolutional output from the first branch is divided element-wise
with the output from the second branch. We then scale the final output with a
learnable scalar parameter α and add the bias term. The compact convolution
module uses just one extra learnable parameter (α) compared to the traditional
convolutional layer.
Since the linear operation in fully-connected layers is a special case of convolu-
tion, the compact convolution operation for these layers results in L2-normalization
and scaling of the feature vectors. It constrains the features to lie on a hyper-
sphere of fixed radius (α), before applying the dot product with the layer param-
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of a compact convolution module.
eters. We call the deep networks with compact convolution modules as Compact
Convolutional Networks (CCNs). They follow the compactness property at every
layer of the network, which greatly enhances their robustness against multiple
kinds of adversarial attacks. The L2-Softmax Loss [8] inherently gets applied in
CCNs.
5 Experiments
We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed defense methods on MNIST [26],
CIFAR10 [5] and ImageNet [27] datasets. The MNIST [26] dataset contains
60, 000 training and 10, 000 test images of handwritten digits. The images are
28 × 28 dimensional with values in [0, 1]. CIFAR10 [5] dataset contains 50, 000
training and 10, 000 test images of 10 classes. The images are 32×32×3 dimen-
sional, with values scaled between 0 and 1.
We use two well-known methods for crafting adversarial attacks: Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method [2] (FGSM) and DeepFool [3]. The FGSM attack adds the sign
of the gradient to the input, scaled by the factor  as shown in (7)
x˜ = x+  sign(∇xJ(θ,x, y)), (7)
where x is the input image, x˜ is the crafted adversarial image, ∇xJ(θ,x, y))
is the gradient of the cost function with respect to the input. This method is
very fast, since it uses a single backward step to generate the attack. On the
other hand, DeepFool [3] iteratively finds the minimal perturbation required
to mis-classify the input in the direction of the nearest class boundary. Though
slower than FGSM [2], DeepFool [3] can generate adversarial images with smaller
magnitude of perturbations, which are indistinguishable to human observer. We
use the Foolbox [28] library to generate these attacks.
The network architectures used for training are provided in the supplemen-
tary material. For training on MNIST [26], we use the architecture proposed by
Papernot et al. [23]. The learning rate is set to 0.1 for the first thirty epochs,
and decreased by a factor of 0.1 after every ten epochs. We train the network
for fifty epochs. For training on CIFAR10 [5], we use the standard VGG11 [29]
network. The convolutional layers use 3 × 3 kernels with padding of one. We
start with a learning rate of 0.1 which is decreased by a factor of 0.2 after 60,
120 and 160 epochs. We train the network for 200 epochs. We use SGD with
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momentum (0.9) and weight decay (5× 10−4) for all our training. We use mean
subtraction of 0.5 as a pre-processing step.
We compare and evaluate the following defense methods against adversarial
attacks:
• SM - The baseline model trained using the typical Softmax loss function.
• LS (Label Smoothing) - The model trained using Softmax Loss with soft labels
{ 190 ,0.9} [24] instead of discrete labels {0,1}• BReLU (Bounded ReLU ) - The model trained using bounded ReLU [25] ac-
tivation function instead of ReLU. The activations are clipped between [0, 1].
• L2SM (L2-Softmax ) - The model trained using L2-Softmax Loss [8] as dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.
• CCN (Compact Convolutional Network) - The model trained with compact
convolution modules instead of traditional convolutional and fully-connected lay-
ers, as discussed in Section 4.
• CCN+LS (Compact Convolutional Network with Label Smoothing) - A CCN
trained using soft labels { 190 ,0.9}
The experiments are organized as follows. Section 5.1 evaluates the proposed
models on MNIST [26], CIFAR10 [5] and ImageNet [27] datasets, against FGSM
and DeepFool attacks in a white-box setting. It also analyzes the effect of ad-
versarial training on different models. Section 5.2 evaluates the robustness in a
black-box setting, and discusses the transferability of various attacks. Section 5.3
compares the robustness using other feature normalization methods such as Lo-
cal Response Normalization [30] and batch-normalization [31].
5.1 White-Box Attacks
In a white-box attack, the attacker has full access to the network to be attacked.
For each of the defense methods, we generate FGSM [2] and DeepFool [3] attack
for MNIST [26] and CIFAR10 [5] testset.
Table 1 provides the classification accuracy of various defense methods on ad-
versarial examples crafted using FGSM [2] for MNIST [26] and CIFAR10 [5] test-
set. We perform evaluations for four different  values {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4}. Higher
values of  lead to larger perturbation, thus decreasing accuracy. Note that  = 0
corresponds to the clean test samples without any adversarial perturbation. From
the table, we find that both CCN and CCN+LS are highly robust to FGSM
attack, with minimal degradation in accuracy. Specifically, for  = 0.3, CCN
achieves an accuracy of 81.38% on MNIST [26] which is more than 2× factor
improvement over the baseline model with accuracy 31.76%. Label Smoothing
along with CCN (CCN+LS ) further enhances the robustness to achieve an accu-
racy of 89.73%. The L2SM model shows significant improvement over the base-
line, which establishes its robustness. A similar trend is observed with FGSM [2]
attack on CIFAR10 [5] testset. Since CIFAR10 is a harder dataset, we use the 
values of { 2255 , 4255 , 8255 , 16255} to craft the FGSM attack. For  = 8255 , we observe
5× improvement using CCN and CCN+LS, compared to the baseline model.
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Table 1. Accuracy (%) on MNIST [26] and CIFAR10 [5] for FGSM [2] attack. The
best accuracy is shown in bold and the second-best accuracy is underlined
MNIST CIFAR10
Method =0 =0.1 =0.2 =0.3 =0.4 =0 =2 =4 =8 =16
SM 99.50 92.61 63.71 31.76 19.39 91.14 60.82 34.62 14.30 8.57
LS [24] 99.53 95.62 85.13 44.25 15.57 91.03 66.7 58.4 54.07 51.05
BReLU [25] 99.54 95.29 74.83 42.51 19.41 90.87 61.49 35.02 18.01 13.73
L2SM 99.48 94.51 79.68 60.32 45.16 91.37 70.58 65.39 63.71 62.59
CCN 99.50 96.99 91.64 81.38 60.65 90.54 73.72 71.47 69.65 66.23
CCN+LS 99.43 97.26 93.68 89.73 75.95 90.51 80.93 79.2 76.8 71.38
Table 2 provides the classification accuracies of different defense methods
against DeepFool [3] attack, on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Since, DeepFool
is an iterative attack, it will mostly find a perturbation to fool the network.
To evaluate using DeepFool, the iterations are carried out until the adversarial
perturbation (η) causes the network to mis-classify, or the ratio of L2-norm of
the perturbation (η) and the input (x) reaches the max-residue-ratio (d), as
given in (8).
‖η‖2
‖x‖2 ≤ d (8)
The evaluations are carried out with different values of d= {0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5}.
From Table 2, we find that LS and CCN perform comparably against DeepFool
attack on MNIST. The model CCN+LS achieves the best performance since it
leverages the qualities of both LS and CCN models. On CIFAR10 dataset, CCN
performs better than LS against DeepFool attack. The effect of label smoothing
is less for CIFAR10, since the probability scores are lower owing to the difficulty
of the dataset. The models CCN and CCN+LS significantly outperform other
defense methods against DeepFool attack.
Table 2. Accuracy (%) for DeepFool [3] attack (with different max-residue-ratio d)
on MNIST [26] and CIFAR10 [5] testset. The best accuracy is shown in bold and the
second-best accuracy is underlined
MNIST CIFAR10
Method d=0.1 d=0.2 d=0.3 d=0.4 d=0.5 d=0.1 d=0.2 d=0.3 d=0.4 d=0.5
SM 93.24 63.22 18.73 1.89 0.53 5.73 5.72 5.72 5.72 5.72
LS [24] 96.85 92.2 88.12 82.05 70.08 57.33 43.93 31.77 21.89 14.6
BReLU [25] 96.15 84.33 70.13 57.25 45.5 22.44 15.49 10.48 7.29 6.37
L2SM 96.5 88.22 75.94 59.47 40.31 66.63 56.93 47.89 38.52 28.85
CCN 97.06 92.18 83.46 69.25 48.54 73.17 71.78 70.24 68.13 64.02
CCN+LS 97.76 95.42 92.43 88.65 84.01 80.8 79.38 78.08 76.43 74.22
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We also provide a quantitative measure of model’s robustness against Deep-
Fool [3] attack in Table 3. The robustness ρadv(kˆ) is computed using (9).
ρadv(kˆ) = Ex
‖rx,kˆ‖2
‖x‖2 , (9)
where rx,kˆ is the generated perturbation, x is the input image, and Ex is the ex-
pectation over the entire test data. Similar to the classification accuracy, the ro-
bustness of LS is higher than CCN for MNIST but lower for CIFAR10. CCN+LS
is the most robust model for both the datasets.
Table 3. Robustness of defense methods against DeepFool [3] attack for MNIST [26]
(left) and CIFAR10 [5] (right). The best robustness is shown in bold and the second-
best robustness is underlined
Method Robustness
SM 0.225
LS [24] 0.571
BReLU [25] 0.493
L2SM 0.441
CCN 0.479
CCN+LS 0.827
Method Robustness
SM 0.014
LS [24] 0.185
BReLU [25] 0.057
L2SM 0.285
CCN 0.549
CCN+LS 0.625
Adversarial Training Goodfellow et al. [2] proposed to train the network
simultaneously with original and crafted adversarial images to improve it’s sta-
bility. However, adversarial training is sensitive to the value of  that is used
to train the network on. We train the models on real and adversarial images
crafted from FGSM attack with  = 0.3 for MNIST, and  = 8255 for CIFAR10
dataset. The classification accuracies of adversarially trained models are reported
in Table 4 for MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. The results show that adversarial
training improves the robustness for all the models. The performances of the
models on MNIST dataset are comparable to each other with accuracy values
above 95%. CIFAR10 results show better distinct between performance of vari-
ous models. Most of the the models perform well for the  value with which they
were trained, but the performance degrades on other  values. The models CCN
and CCN+LS are are less sensitive to the training perturbation amount, and
consistently stable across all the  values.
Evaluation on ImageNet dataset We also analyze the adversarial robust-
ness of the proposed methods on ILSVRC [27] object classification dataset. The
dataset contains 1.2M training images and 50k validation images with 1000 class
labels. The dataset is more challenging than MNIST and CIFAR10 as it contains
large images in real-world settings. We use off-the-shelf VGG11 [29] network for
training the models. Table 5 provides the classification accuracy of various de-
fense methods on adversarial examples crafted using FGSM [2] and DeepFool [3]
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Table 4. Accuracy (%) with adversarial training against FGSM [2] attack on
MNIST [26] and CIFAR10 [5] testset. The best accuracy is shown in bold and the
second-best accuracy is underlined
MNIST CIFAR10
Method =0 =0.1 =0.2 =0.3 =0.4 =0 =2 =4 =8 =16
SM 99.49 96.51 98.67 99.15 96.06 83.8 71.56 67.18 71.46 43.09
LS [24] 99.45 98.4 98.77 99.31 98.79 83.28 77.68 69.07 52.13 34.04
BReLU [25] 99.43 96.79 98.93 99.42 97.12 85.37 72.93 67.08 80.73 31.01
L2SM 99.47 96.88 98.7 99.32 84.03 84.8 73.08 68.31 74.95 49.64
CCN 99.44 98.18 98.71 99.09 96.9 87.08 73.27 75.8 76.78 61.97
CCN+LS 99.48 98.65 98.8 98.93 94.13 87.17 76.68 77.53 77.66 70.17
attacks. We use the  values of {0.1,0.3,0.5,1.0} normalized by 255 to craft the
FGSM attack. From the table, we find that LS and CCN+LS are more robust
to FGSM attack. On DeepFool [3] attack, CCN+LS is the most robust model
followed by LS.
Additionally, we see a significant improvement in top-1 accuracy(%) by using
compact learning framework. L2SM achieves a top-1 accuracy of 68.78% while
CCN achieves the accuracy of 68%, which is 8% gain over the baseline SM
model. Having large number of classes improves the discriminative capacity of
compact learning leading to improved accuracy. We intend to analyze the effect
of compactness for large number of classes in future work.
Table 5. Accuracy (%) on ILSVRC [27] validation set for FGSM [2] attack (left).
Robustness of defense methods against DeepFool [3] attack (right). The best accuracy
is shown in bold and the second-best accuracy is underlined
Method  = 0  = 0.1  = 0.3  = 0.5  = 1.0
SM 60.52 47.19 25.72 17.02 10.14
LS [24] 63.80 58.84 43.17 32.55 20.21
BReLU [25] 67.08 53.05 27.35 17.50 10.75
L2SM 68.78 56.66 33.74 22.95 13.92
CCN 68.00 51.43 28.57 19.54 12.68
CCN+LS 66.64 53.22 36.63 29.90 23.53
Method Robustness (in %)
SM 0.1325
LS [24] 0.2951
BReLU [25] 0.1463
L2SM 0.1911
CCN 0.1439
CCN+LS 0.4027
5.2 Black-Box Attacks
In a typical black-box attack, the attacker has no information about the network
architecture, its parameters or the training dataset. The attacker can query the
network and can get the output class label for a given input. We use the black-
box attack proposed by Papernot et al. [32] to evaluate the proposed models.
The model on which the attack has to be applied is the defense model, and
the model learned to replicate the behavior of defense model is the substitute
model. We treat our defense models as oracle, and train substitute models using
LeNet [33] architecture as described in [32]. Table 6 reports the accuracy of
the defense models against FGSM attack generated using the corresponding
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substitute models. We observe that CCN and CCN+LS models are most robust
to practical black-box attacks, and are consistent across different  values. Hence,
the results show that the proposed models are robust to both white box as well
as black box attacks.
Table 6. Accuracy (%) against practical black-box FGSM attack (with different ) on
MNIST [26] testset. The best accuracy is shown in bold and the second-best accuracy
is underlined
Method  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 0.3  = 0.4
SM 98.49 87.44 55.41 32.84
LS [24] 98.89 91.12 52.53 29.28
BReLU [25] 98.90 91.96 66.45 39.44
L2SM 98.99 93.37 56.67 26.63
CCN 99.15 96.76 77.27 28.19
CCN+LS 99.24 97.33 84.14 32.94
Transferability of Adversarial Samples It has been shown in [32] that
adversarial examples generated by one type of network can be used to fool a
different type of network. This makes it easier for the attackers to generate
adversarial samples using their independently trained models. Our defense model
should be immune to the attacks generated by itself, as well to attacks generated
from a different network.
Tables 7 and 8 report the accuracies on transfered attacks between different
defense models. (∗) in the tables indicates that the adversarial attacks were
crafted and tested on the same network, causing maximum impact. We find that
the networks are more vulnerable to the transfered attacks generated using the
baseline model SM. Among all models, CCN and CCN+LS are most robust
to transferred attacks. Also, the attacks generated using these models are less
likely to fool other models. This shows that CCN and CCN+LS provide a two-
way defense. Firstly, these models would be less vulnerable to any unknown
adversarial attacks. Secondly, the attacks generated using these models would
be less harmful for any unknown network.
5.3 Effect of Feature Normalization Methods
In this experiment, we analyze the effect of Local Response Normalization (LRN) [30]
and batch-normalization [31] on the robustness of the network and compare it
to the proposed approach. Although both these methods normalizes the fea-
tures based on local activations or input batch statistics, they do not ensure
compactness. LRN layer implements a form of lateral inhibition given by (10)
bix,y = a
i
x,y/
k + αmin(N−1,i+n/2)∑
j=max(0,i−n/2)
(ajx,y)
2
β , (10)
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Table 7. Accuracy (%) on MNIST [26] against transfer attacks crafted using FGSM
( = 0.3). The best accuracy is shown in bold and the second-best accuracy is under-
lined
Attack crafted on
Attack tested on SM LS [24] BReLU [25] L2SM CCN CCN+LS
SM 31.76∗ 61.41 54.22 77.88 91.22 93.84
LS [24] 49.48 44.25∗ 53.63 80.47 91.76 94.69
BReLU [25] 52.62 66.43 42.51∗ 79.69 90.82 93.77
L2SM 52.01 64.93 58.91 60.32∗ 90.65 93.59
CCN 64.15 75.7 66.55 82.7 81.38∗ 93.53
CCN+LS 70.18 80.83 71.49 85.29 90.49 89.73∗
Table 8. Accuracy (%) on CIFAR10 [5] against transfer attacks crafted using FGSM
( = 8
255
). The best accuracy is shown in bold and the second-best accuracy is under-
lined
Attack crafted on
Attack tested on SM LS [24] BReLU [25] L2SM CCN CCN+LS
SM 14.30∗ 59.14 33.63 67.13 77.77 82.91
LS [24] 31.16 54.07∗ 33.28 67.26 77.84 83.11
BReLU [25] 33.63 59.65 18.01∗ 67.96 77.85 82.95
L2SM 32.59 59.95 35.01 63.71∗ 77.76 82.78
CCN 41.33 63.6 42.37 69.63 69.65∗ 80.53
CCN+LS 41.48 63.48 42.29 69.98 73.74 76.8∗
where aix,y is the input activation at location (x, y) and channel i, b
i
x,y is
the corresponding output activation. The values of constants k, n, α and β
are are set as provided in [30]. On the other hand, batch-normalization [31]
reduces the internal covariate shift, by normalizing the features across the in-
put batch. We compare the performance of the models trained with LRN and
batch-normalization (BN ) with the baseline model SM in Table 9. We find
from our experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets that LRN or batch-
normalization either improves marginally or weakens the robustness of the net-
work. Our proposed models CCN and CCN+LS significantly outperforms LRN
and BN models for both MNIST [26] and CIFAR10 [5] datasets.
Table 9. Accuracy (%) on MNIST [26] and CIFAR10 [5] for FGSM [2] attack. The
best accuracy is shown in bold and the second-best accuracy is underlined
MNIST CIFAR10
Method =0 =0.1 =0.2 =0.3 =0.4 =0 =2 =4 =8 =16
SM 99.50 92.61 63.71 31.76 19.39 91.14 60.82 34.62 14.30 8.57
BN [31] 99.58 88.48 30.72 11.20 9.24 92.34 59.47 40.63 26.7 16.58
LRN [30] 99.28 88.59 52.52 25.61 13.21 91.33 60.68 34.82 14.99 9.08
CCN 99.50 96.99 91.64 81.38 60.65 90.54 73.72 71.47 69.65 66.23
CCN+LS 99.43 97.26 93.68 89.73 75.95 90.51 80.93 79.2 76.8 71.38
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6 Network Architectures
Table 10 provides the network architectures used for training. For training on
MNIST [26], we use the architecture proposed by Papernot et al. [23]. For train-
ing on CIFAR10 [5], we use the standard VGG11 [29] network.
Table 10. Overview of network architectures for MNIST [26] and CIFAR10 [5] datasets
Layer MNIST CIFAR10
Conv+ReLU 32 filters (3x3) 64 filters (3x3)
Conv+ReLU 32 filters (3x3) 128 filters (3x3)
MaxPool 2x2 2x2
Conv+ReLU 64 filters (3x3) 256 filters (3x3)
Conv+ReLU 64 filters (3x3) 256 filters (3x3)
MaxPool 2x2 2x2
Conv+ReLU - 512 filters (3x3)
Conv+ReLU - 512 filters (3x3)
MaxPool - 2x2
Conv+ReLU - 512 filters (3x3)
Conv+ReLU - 512 filters (3x3)
MaxPool - 2x2
FC+ReLU 200 units 512 units
FC+ReLU 200 units 512 units
Softmax 10 units 10 units
7 C&W Attack
We evaluate different network defense methods against the attack proposed by
Carlini and Wagner [10] (C&W Attack). L2-distance metric of the adversarial
perturbation is optimized to generate the attack, as given by:
minimize ‖1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)− x‖22 + c f(1
2
(tanh(w) + 1)), (11)
where x is the input image, and w is the variable to be optimized. For the target
class t, the function f corresponding to input x˜ is given by:
f(x˜) = max(max{Z(x˜)i : i 6= t} − Z(x˜)t,−κ), (12)
where Z(x˜)i is the logit value for the i
th class, and κ is the confidence with
which the misclassification occurs. In our experiments, we set as the target class
t to the class with second-highest classification score. The confidence κ is set to
zero. The maximum number of iterations is set to 1000, and the search step is
limited to 6. We observe that C&W attack is approximately 100× slower than
FGSM attack [2].
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Table 11. Mean L2-distance between the input and perturbed image on MNIST
dataset, along with the success probability of generating the C&W attack. The best
result is shown in bold and the second-best result is underlined
Method Mean Distance Success Prob.
SM 1.393 100
LS [24] 1.626 100
BReLU [25] 1.473 100
L2SM 1.453 100
CCN 1.449 100
CCN+LS 2.079 96.54
Table 12. Mean L2-distance between the input and perturbed image on CIFAR10
dataset, along with the success probability of generating the C&W attack. The best
result is shown in bold and the second-best result is underlined
Method Mean Distance Success Prob.
SM 0.277 100
LS [24] 0.413 100
BReLU [25] 0.312 99.13
L2SM 0.717 94.26
CCN 0.352 99.95
CCN+LS 0.471 99.08
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Tables 11 and 12 show the performance of difference defense methods against
C&W attack [10], on MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets respectively. We report the
mean L2-distance between the original and the adversarial samples, along with
the success probability of generating the C&W attack. A higher mean distance
signifies that the defense method is more robust. For MNIST dataset, we observe
a behavior similar to the DeepFool [3] attack. The CCN+LS model significantly
outperforms the other defense approaches, followed by LS model. For CIFAR10
dataset, we find that L2-softmax loss (L2SM ) achieves the best performance
with a mean distance of 0.717. It is followed by CCN+LS with a mean distance
of 0.471.
8 Ablation Study
8.1 Robustness analysis of compactness for each layer
In this section, we analyze the layer-wise effect of compactness on the robustness
of a network. We replace one layer from a CNN with the proposed compact
convolutional module, and train the entire network on MNIST [26] dataset. We
use the same network architecture as given in Table 10.
Table 13 provides the accuracy of different networks, where only one layer
is implemented using compact convolution, against FGSM [2] attack ( = 0.3)
on MNIST [26] testset. We see that the effect of compactness on the network’s
robustness decreases with the depth of the network till a certain layer, after which
it increases consistently. The network without any compact layer is equivalent to
the SM model, and achieves the accuracy of 31.76%. Applying compact module
only to the conv1 layer improves the accuracy to 44.38%. Each of the conv2,
conv3 and conv4 layers decreases the accuracy marginally. The behavior gets
reversed in fully connected layers, for which the accuracy increases when compact
module is applied to a deeper layer. Applying compact module only to the last
fully connected layer (fc3) is equivalent to the L2SM model, and achieves the
best accuracy of 60.32%. This shows that compactness has moderate effect in
the shallower layers of the network, and has maximum effect in the deepest layer
of the network.
8.2 t-SNE visualization of adversarial features
In this subsection, we analyze the effect of compactness on the separability of
features. Fig. 5 provides a two dimensional t-SNE [34] visualization of the fea-
tures obtained after conv1, fc1 and fc2 layers of the network, for SM, L2SM
and CCN models respectively. The features are computed for the adversarial
images generated using FGSM attack ( = 0.3), for two randomly chosen classes
from MNIST [26]. From the figure, it is evident that the features from CCN
and L2SM are more separable compared to features from SM. The difference
in separability is minimum for the initial layers of the network (such as conv1),
and dominant for the deeper layers (such as fc1 and fc2).
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Table 13. Accuracy (%) against FGSM attack (with  = 0 and  = 0.3) on MNIST [26]
testset. The best accuracy is shown in bold and the second-best accuracy is underlined
Compact Layer  = 0  = 0.3
None 99.50 31.76
conv1 99.50 44.38
conv2 99.51 42.34
conv3 99.50 39.80
conv4 99.54 39.04
fc1 99.58 44.19
fc2 99.57 58.71
fc3 99.48 60.32
8.3 Analysis of learned network filters
In this subsection, we analyze and compare the characteristics of the weight
filters learned for SM, L2SM and CCN models. We compute the top 50 singular
values (SVs) for the weight matrix of conv1, conv2, conv3, conv4, fc1 and fc2
layers, and plot their magnitudes in Fig. 6. From the figure, we observe that the
fc2 layer of CCN and L2SM models has fewer dominant singular values that
decay very rapidly compared to SVs of SM model. This suggests that CCN and
L2SM models have a strong suppression for the trailing dimensions, which makes
them stable to the adversarial variations in the data. For the initial layers of the
networks, the SVs for CCN, L2SM and SM models are dominant throughout,
since they are less invariant to input deformations.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that learning features by imposing compactness con-
straints can improve a network’s robustness against adversarial attacks. The
L2-Softmax Loss, that ensures feature compactness, provide better robustness
compared to naive softmax loss. This property is applied to each layer of the net-
work using compact convolutional modules (CCN), which significantly reduces
the network’s vulnerability to adversarial perturbations. In future, we would
further analyze the necessary properties for a network to be robust, and build
sophisticated architectures that are provably robust to adversarial attacks.
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Fig. 6. Average singular value (SV) spectrum showing top 50 SVs of the weight matrix
for each layer of the network.
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